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1. Introduction 
Economists have been preoccupied with the factors that determine economic growth at least 
since the publication of Adam Smith‘s  (1776) An inquiry into the nature and causes of the 
wealth of nations. Several studies have attempted to explain why some countries grow faster than 
others and why some seem to even fall behind. The analysis in these studies is generally based 
on aggregate production functions and suggests that growth differences among countries can be 
attributed to differences in physical capital, human capital and productivity. While it is obvious 
that a highly skilled worker using a sophisticated machine can be several times more productive 
than a labourer working with rudimentary tools, it is far from clear why such differences in 
technological  levels  and  labour  characteristics  exist  in  the  first  place  and  why  they  persist. 
Economic theory cannot praise itself for giving such superficial and tautological explanations to 
cross-country differences in growth.  
Aware of these limitations, some economists decided to expand the list of their explanatory 
variables  and  included  public  infrastructure  (Aschauer,  1990;  Munnell,  1992;  Easterly  and 
Rebelo, 1993), nature of political systems and educational attainment (Barro and Lee, 1993), 
cultural factors (Dieckmann, 1996; Harrison, 1992), ethnic and linguistic differences (Easterly 
and Levine, 1997), and even religion (McCleary and Barro, 2006). A number of theoretical and 
empirical studies lend their support to this approach. Some have found high returns to public 
infrastructure (Sanchez-Robles, 1998; Kelly, 1997) while others have shown that educational 
levels and democracy play a major role (Barro, 1999; Barro, 2002). A common feature of these 
models, however, is the assumption that the additional factors are endogenously determined by 
their environment. For instance, a poor country (perhaps with unstable political system and so 
on) will admittedly spend less on public infrastructure and education and therefore could not 
immediately improve its weak institutions, which limits its prospects for economic growth. The 
implication, which is never explicit in these models, is that less developed countries are trapped 
in a vicious circle of endless poverty. These conclusions are not encouraging in terms of policy 
solutions to growth problems and in fact do not contribute much to the advancement of economic 
theory in its search for the mechanisms that can help improve economic performance.  
Expanding the list further to incorporate yet more variables is clearly not the answer. In our 
opinion,  what  is  needed  is  a  policy-oriented  approach;  one  which  can  promote  growth,  and 
maximize it if needed, by using tools and instruments that are readily available to the policy-
maker. Many scholars agree that government policies are indeed very powerful tools that can 
shape the economic and social environment within which human activity is carried out. In his 
review of the literature on growth that followed the Second World War, Amartya Sen (1970: 9) 
remarked that although it was expected that growth theory would be ‗practice-oriented‘ in order 
to solve the problems of both war-damaged and underdeveloped economies ―its link with public 
policy is often very remote‖. Even though this remark is justified to some extent, we think that it 
applies mostly to developing countries and particularly to those that are lagging behind.  2 
 
It is legitimate to ask why is the link between public policy and growth so remote in developing 
countries? Amsden (2007) sees a clear connection between the US policies and poor countries 
performance but one obvious answer is that international organizations, including NGOs, tend to 
present  development  as  a  complex,  difficult-to-understand  process;  therefore  implying,  often 
explicitly,  that  any  policy  attempts  to  deal  with  the  problems  of  underdevelopment  will 
inevitably fail. The underlying argument is that the private sector, and not the government, is the 
driving force of the economy and consequently there is no need for government intervention, 
particularly when we know that interventions in the form of an expansionary fiscal policy, for 
instance,  require  the  use  of  ‗public  funds‘,  which  are  assumed  to  be  limited  (Toye,  2000). 
Following the advice of the so-called experts, policymakers in these countries feel powerless in 
the face of widespread poverty, cross their arms and hope for help from the ‗West‘.  
However,  we  know  from  history  that  over  the  past  three  hundred  years  or  so,  advanced 
industrialized countries of Western Europe and North America have typically relied on heavy 
state  intervention  for  their  development  (Dutt  1992;  Thurow  1992).  Several  studies  also 
demonstrate that recent success stories of the East Asian ―miracle‖ economies have been based 
on  the  implementation  of  carefully  designed  trade  and  investment  policies  (Amsden,  1996; 
Amsden et al. 2003; Wade 2004). Of course, the same is true of Japan, and more recently Brazil, 
India, China and several other NICs (newly industrialized countries). In all these cases, the state 
planned, subsidized, and protected by tariffs or quotas, what it considered vital sectors of the 
economy. The state also built and maintained the public infrastructure and provided all the basic 
social services from health care to education.  
In what follows, we develop a model in which government spending and taxing (fiscal policy) 
and interest rates (monetary policy) are key control variables that can be used to achieve the 
objective of higher economic growth. It is shown that these policies are useful both in fighting 
recessions in developed countries and in helping developing countries master their destiny and 
break out of poverty by implementing New-Deal type of industrialization programs. 
2. The Model 
The model developed here is, in many ways, an extension of the one proposed by Smithin (2003) 
in which aggregate demand and the distribution of income play a major role in economic growth. 
The distinguishing feature of our model is that it highlights the role of the public sector and more 
specifically the role of economic policies in stimulating growth. To focus the discussion on the 
role  of  ‗national‘  economic  policies,  we  leave  aside  the  complication  of  the  foreign  sector. 
Therefore, in a closed economy, the expenditure-based breakdown of the (real) gross domestic 
product (GDP)  t Y  is the sum of demand emanating from the private sector  t t p I C D    and the 
(net) demand from the public sector ) ( t t g Y Y D     : 
t t t g p t Y I C D D Y ) (          ,            (1) 3 
 
where Ct is spending on goods and services by households and  t I  is the aggregate spending by 
firms whereas     is government spending (not only on goods and services, wages and so on, but 
also on public investment) as a share of GDP and   is the share taken out in the form of various 
taxes. Assuming a standard Keynesian consumption function,  t C  can be written as 
t t t cY X C                     (2) 
Where  t X  stands for the autonomous spending and c is the marginal propensity to consume out 
of the current income. If we consider that profitability is the main concern for firms, we can 
expect their spending to be driven by the expected profitability, hence  
t t e I                     (3) 
where  e is the share of profits  t  allocated to investment and related expenditures. Substituting 
(3) and (2) into (1) we get 
t t t t t t t t t Y e cY X Y e cY X Y               ) (        (4) 
where we have denoted net public spending by       , which is either an injection into the 
economy in the case of a deficit (  > 0) or a withdrawal in the case of a surplus (  < 0). If we 
assume  that   , 0 ) 1     c divide  through  by  initial  GDP  ) ( 0 Y and  let  t Y
X x
t 



















t                (5) 
where  t y   is  the  rate  of  growth  of  real  GDP  during  the  time  interval  t , 0 ,  since  by 
definition 0 ) 1 ( Y y Y t t   . Since higher economic growth is, and thus far has always been, a policy 
objective for practically all governments, we claim that  governments can indeed achieve this 
goal by using the standard policy tools namely the interest rate r (monetary policy) and the level 
of net public spending  (fiscal policy). Hence, in this case the policymaker would be facing an 
optimal  control  problem  which  consists  of  maximizing  economic  growth  by  choosing  the 
appropriate levels of interest rates and net public spending.  
If we now let autonomous consumption be constant, that is, set  X Xt  , so that 
0 Y
X
t x x   , for 
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Since the share of profits  t k  is possibly  time-dependent,  the  maximal  value of  ) , ( 0 k t V may 
depend, in addition to time t , also on the initial share of profits  ) ( 0 k so that the solution requires 
us to specify the dynamics of  t k . To this end, consider an income distribution similar to that 
which is suggested by Smithin (2003) where workers receive wages, capitalists receive profits 
and rentiers (money lenders) receive interest. In this framework, GDP can be decomposed as 
follows 
) )( 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( t t t t t t t L w k r w k r Y                (7) 
where  t r  is rentiers‘ share,  t k is capitalists‘ share and  t w  is workers‘ share. The latter can also be 
written in terms of an average wage level  t w  received by all the workers in the economy  t L as 




t w k r
L
Y
A ) 1 )( 1 (                   (8) 
By Taylor expansion, we know that        
t t t t t t t t t w k r A a w k r A ln ln ) exp( ) exp(             (9)  
From this approximation, we write the natural logarithm of labour productivity,  t a , as 
w k r a t t                    (10) 
where  w w ln  is the natural logarithm of average real wages. In order to take into account the 
effects of public policy on wages, we further assume that 
  w w w ) ( 0                       (11) 
where  0 w  is the basic income reflecting the position and the bargaining power of labour in 
society, which is augmented by  w   (e.g., in the form of unemployment benefits) but reduced by 
w   (in the form of premiums paid to the unemployment insurance funds and other deductions). 
Our wage relation, therefore, can be written as 
) ( 1
0
   

w





w             (12) 
where       . Since      and     , we can expect   to be some positive function of  , 
) (  f  ,  meaning  that  when  net  government  injections  increase,  we  expect  an  increase  in 
wages because of the higher unemployment benefits and other income-support payments made to 5 
 
workers  and  the  lower  deductions  in  the  form  of  premiums  paid  out  of  income  to  the 
unemployment insurance fund. To simplify things, we assume that    ) ( f for some ) 1 , 0 (   . 





r a k t t                 (13) 
Now substitute (13) into (5) to get the rate of growth of real GDP as a function of  net public 

















              (14) 
In this context, the problem of growth becomes simply how to maximize   given the policy 
instruments available to the government. This can be considered as an optimal control problem 
where the state variable is  t y  and the control variables are the rate of interest  r and the size of 
the budget deficit  which is manipulated through government injections    and withdrawals   
of  liquidity  into/from  the  private  sector.  It  is  worth  noticing  that  if  labour  productivity  is 
constant,  then  both  t k   and  (consequently)  t y are  time-independent  and  the  control  problem 
reduces to a static optimization. Therefore, if we let  a at   for all  , 0  t then the optimization 



























, with constraints  min r r  and  c  1    (15) 
3. Using Fiscal and Monetary Policies to Promote Growth 
It is worth observing that the objective function corresponds now to the long run equilibrium 
GDP  expressed  as  a  multiple  of  initial  GDP  (see  Appendix  2).  The  inequality-constrained 
maximization problem given in equation (15) can be solved by applying the standard Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) method. Here we provide the main steps of the procedure but the details are 
given in Appendix 1. First, the Lagrangian of the problem is  
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          (16) 6 
 
The necessary conditions for an extremum point are obtained by taking the partial derivatives of 
the  Lagrangian  L  with  respect  to  r and   and  setting  these  derivatives  equal  to  zero. 
Furthermore, the Lagrange multipliers and  must be non-negative and at an extremum point 
0 ) ( min  r r  and  0 )) 1 ( (    c   .  Inspection  of  the  first  necessary  condition 
0  r L immediately shows that the only candidate for a maximizer is  min
* r r  . Since the absolute 
value  of  the  objective  function  in  equation  (15)  approaches  infinity  as  c  1  ,  the 



























1  Otherwise the 
value of the objective can be made arbitrarily large by letting   be sufficiently  close  to  the 
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
                  (17) 
Given that condition (15) is satisfied, there exists  c  1
*   such that the objective function in 
equation (15) achieves an extremal value when 
*    . This extremum point can be found from 
the second necessary condition  0   L by observing that the zeroes and the sign of   L coincide 
with the zeroes and the sign of a second degree polynomial in  given by 
          x r a e c ew ew x r a e x r a e p               ) ( )) 1 ( 1 ( ) ( 2 ) ( ) ( 0 0
2 2           (18) 
(this function is obtained by multiplying the expression of   L with 
2 ) 1 (   , and rearranging the 
terms of the numerator of the ensuing expression). The graph of  ) ( p is a parabola opening 
downwards, if  
0 ) (    x r a e .                    (19) 
Only in this case is the extremum a maximum. If condition (19) is not satisfied, the extremum is 
a minimum and the maximization problem is not well posed. Given that conditions (17) and (19) 
are satisfied, the maximization problem (15) is well posed and the maximizing value of    is 



























0  . Moreover, when conditions (17) and (19) are satisfied,  2 1 1      c and 
1  is the maximizing value.  
The new parameter    introduced in equation (20) can be interpreted as the share of the basic 
wage in firms‘ profits. Therefore, it cannot take on very large values since this would effectively 
mean that workers are paid more than their contribution to total productivity. Clearly, this is not 
feasible nor can it be sustainable in the long run if it ever happened. Intuitively then, and for all 
practical purposes, we would expect this parameter to lie strictly between the values of zero and 
unity. If   is low, it would indicate that labour‘s basic earnings are quite low compared to the 
earnings of other groups and, therefore, that income distribution is biased toward the capitalists 
and the rentiers. Similarly, high values of    would indicate that workers reap a larger share of 
productivity. Income distribution in either case would have different implications for economic 
growth. This is reminiscent of the debate over whether growth is wage-led or profit led, which is 
beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper  (see Setterfield, 2003).  In  any  case,  the  parameter   can  be 
considered an indicator of income distribution since it largely reflects the bargaining position of 
labour in society.  
The importance of this income-distribution variable in our model is that it has direct implications 
for  the  values  of 
*  ,  that  is,  the  optimal fiscal  policy  that  maximizes  growth.    Hence,  for 
reasonable parameter values of ,  1   is likely to be positive (and very close to zero if it is 
negative) – that is to say, the ‗normal‘ fiscal policy that is consistent with growth and expansion 
of the economy is for the government to be running budget deficits. The above discussion can be 
succinctly summarized by noting that the larger the value of   is, the smaller the value of 1   will 
be; in particular, if 





 , then 0 1               (21) 
Our condition (17) can be also expressed in terms of   in the following manner:  
) 1 ( 1 c      .              (22) 
Combining (21) and (22), we get that 
) 1 ( 1
1




   

            (23) 
Which  allows  us  to  conclude  that  the  maximization  problem  (15)  has  a  unique  solution 
) , ( ) , ( 1 min
* *   r r  such  that c    1 0
*  .  This  simply  means  that  fiscal  policy  must  remain 8 
 
expansionary if we are to maximize growth. As can be seen in Figure 1, the growth rate of real 
GDP can be maximized if the government maintains c    1 0
*  , that is to say, if it constantly 
runs  a  budget  deficit;  the  size  of  which  is  determined  by the  value  of  the  parameter   as 
explained above. Fiscal policy turns out to be a very powerful instrument for any growth and 
development strategy.  
 
Figure 1: The Optimizing Role of Fiscal Policy 
 
In  addition  to  this  well-defined solution, there  are two other  cases,  which are  extremes and 
irrelevant but which we mention here for the sake of completeness (see Figure 2). The first one is 
when ) 1 ( 1 c      . Here the maximization problem (15) is undefined and must be rejected as 
can be seen in panel (a) of Figure 2 below.   
Figure 2: The Extreme Cases 
The second unlikely event (panel b) is when 





 . Here, there is a unique solution 
and 0
*   , which means that the government would be running a budget surplus (see Figure 2). 9 
 
However, as we mentioned above, for practically relevant parameter values, this last case is 
unlikely  to  occur  since  it  would  mean  that  the  basic  wage  is  exceeding  high,  which  is  not 
feasible. Therefore, we conclude that this case must also be ruled out and that the unique solution 
that prevails is  c    1 0
*   which means that fiscal policy must be expansionary;  with the 
public sector running budgets deficits. 
4. Policy Recommendations 
If we now focus on the interior solution, the policy implications of our results are quite clear: 
economic growth – and development in general- can be maximized if the government follows a 
two-pronged active interventionist strategy based on the following principles: 
a.  Through its central bank, the government exogenously sets the interest rate at its lowest 
level ) ( min r (which can be zero), thus reflecting Keynes‘s recommendation that ―we . . . 
retain  control  of  our  domestic  rate  of  interest,  and  keep  it  as  low  as  suits  our  own 
purposes. . .‖ (Quoted in Smithin and Wolf, 1993: p. 370). 
b.  Adopting a deficit-spending policy which means that total government expenditures must 
exceed what is taken out in the form of taxes and other contributions from the private 
sector.  
These conclusions are often regarded as practical by the pragmatic policymaker and by most 
Keynesian-inspired  economists  as  the  2008-9  crisis  has  demonstrated.  Indeed,  as  the  crisis 
worsened, most governments responded by slashing interest rates in an effort to encourage the 
injection  of  liquidity  into  the  system  and  promote  private  spending  but  since  business 
expectations remained low, it became necessary for governments to increase their net spending; 
therefore leading to huge budget deficits. As it has been shown elsewhere, deficits in the public 
sector stimulate the economy and are necessary for growth and expansion because, from an 
accounting perspective, they are equivalent to surpluses in the private sector (see, among others, 
Godley and Lavoie 2007). This is easily demonstrated by noticing that equation (1) above can be 
re-arranged to read 
t t t t t t Y I S I C Y ) ( ) (                     (24)  
Where the right-hand side  ) ( t t I S  represents the net private saving, which if we want it to be 
positive, i.e., if we want to have a surplus in the private sector, we must necessarily have a deficit 
on the left-hand side, i.e., in the public sector. The relevance of this accounting principal is 
supported by empirical evidence as can be seen in Figure 3 below where we have plotted the net 
lending/borrowing by the consolidated government sector in Canada (the public sector) as well 
as the net lending/borrowing by the private sector (represented by households and non-financial 
corporations), both as a percentage of GDP for the period from 1961 to 2008 (using quarterly 
data). Figure 3 clearly shows that whenever the public sector is running a deficit, the private 
sector as a whole will be running a surplus, and vice versa. Even in terms of size, the large public 
deficits of the mid-1970s to the late 1990s were translated into large surpluses (net accumulation) 10 
 
in the private sector. Therefore, the public budget really does reflect—almost like a mirror—the 
private  sector‘s  net  accumulation  of  savings.  The  empirical  evidence  presented  here  (also 
verified for other countries, see, Leclaire, 2008) should make those economists who advocate 
balanced budgets or surpluses think more seriously about the implications of their statements for 
the well-being of the economy. 
 
Figure 3: Public Sector versus Private Sector Net Balances, Canada 1961-2008 
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM series nos. V31751, V31786, V33360, V498086 
Furthermore,  if  we  recognize  that  total  private  saving ) ( t S is  composed  of  both  households‘ 
saving  ) ( h S and firms‘ saving or their profits  ) ( f S , equation (24) can be re-written as  
t h t f Y S I S ) ( ) (                     (25) 
Equation  (25)  clearly  indicates  that,  in  the  absence  of  the  foreign  sector,  firms‘  profits  are 
positively affected by investment and government spending (usually referred to as injections). It 
is also clear that households‘ savings and taxes (leakages) lower business profits. In other words, 
long-run firms‘ profits can be sustained by low or negative households‘ savings (indebtedness) 
and/or by a public budget deficit (for more details on this, see, among others, Bougrine 2004). 
Given the centrality of profits in the capitalist system and given that households‘ indebtedness 
cannot be relied upon for a long time to sustain firms‘ profitability; the only viable policy for 
improving private sector‘s wealth is the public deficit. In addition to this, of course, interest rates 
must  be  kept  at  a  minimum  as  indicated  by  the  maximization  solution  given  above.  These 11 
 
policies  have  proved  to  be  quite  effective  in  dealing  with  the  current  crisis  (2009)  as 
governments around the world incurred large budget deficits in order to finance what has become 
known as a ‗stimulus package‘, which typically consisted of a wide variety of public programs, 
subsidies  or  outright  acquisitions  of  some  private  enterprises  that  were  on  the  verge  of 
bankruptcy.   
The  relevance  of  these  policies  cannot  be  over-emphasized  in  the  case  of  many  developing 
countries which seem to be in a constant need of stimuli packages because of the chronic poverty 
and high unemployment they have been facing for decades. Indeed, to build the much needed 
infrastructure, provide the essential public services (e.g., health, education) and establish social 
programs of insurance and welfare similar to what is found in developed countries, it would 
require massive injections and large public budget deficits. These countries are truly in need of a 
New-Deal program to build the material base for development whereby the state must take the 
responsibility  of  building  the  public  infrastructure  (roads,  schools,  hospitals)  and  providing 
universal health care and education as well as a social safety net to protect the most vulnerable 
people in society. These are the essential elements of any growth strategy and experience has 
demonstrated that there can be no take-off in their absence.   
Why are these countries in such a dire situation? Why is there a serious lack of all the basic 
ingredients of growth and development? Historians obviously have a lot to say about this (see, 
for instance, Rodney 1973) but a popular answer is that the lack of development is justified by 
the lack of money. This is indeed the case but economists differ on what are the sources of 
money.  Mainstream  economists  tend  to  argue  that  the  financing  of  the  programs  mentioned 
above can only be done through taxation
1. Toye (2000: 36), for instance, attributes the existence 
of  the  welfare  state  and  its  social  programs  in  developed  countries  to  their  success  in 
―establishing the institutions necessary for the direct taxation of the majority of adult population 
during the first half of the twentieth century.‖ Referring to the situation in developing countries, 
he notes that ―The absence of direct  personal  taxation on the revenue side of the budget  is 
matched by the absence, on the expenditure side, of much spending on social security, education 
and health services.‖ The conclusion, then, is that since there are limits of the use of increased 
taxation to raise additional government revenue and since borrowing and money creation have 
their own problems (crowding out and inflation), the future for these countries in terms of growth 
and development is bleak indeed.  
However, from our perspective there is no reason for such pessimism. In fact, we argue here that 
a sovereign (national) government, with its own central bank, faces no budget constraints and 
                                                       
1 Toye (2000: 35) maintains that ―the objective of taxation is, fundamentally, to increase government 
revenue‖ and that ―the ability to tax the domestic population is not just another method of financing government 
expenditure, one among a variety of others. The non-taxation options for financing are secondary and derivative. 
Their exploitation requires that the government maintain a sound system of domestic taxation. This is the economic 
sense in which there is a primacy and a centrality about taxation in the entire armoury of instruments of government 
finance.‖  12 
 
that it can pay for any expenditure—whether it is related to building a new hospital, a school, or 
a highway, or to the hiring of teachers, nurses, engineers, or street sweepers—simply by creating 
new money. But what is money and how is it created? In modern capitalist economies, money is 
created by banks in the form of credit whenever banks agree to give loans to investors. Investors 
will transfer these credits as wages to their employees and as payments to the suppliers of raw 
materials and equipment and the providers of other services related to production. These credits 
do not necessarily take the form of bills or coins and more often than not, they are simple 
scriptures on the books of the banks (or more accurately, digital symbols on the hard discs of 
their computers). In the private sector, investors (or entrepreneurs) engage in this sort of activity 
because they are motivated by profits. Their earnings are used to pay back the banks. Investors in 
the public sector—and the government in particular—do not necessarily seek profits, because the 
benefits  from  their  investments  will  be  enjoyed  by  the  whole  population.  Their  investment 
expenditures, however, are also financed via bank credit advances. In most cases, the bank that 
advances these credits to the government has traditionally been the central bank.
2 
As several studies of the practice of modern banking have shown (see, among others, Lavoie and 
Seccareccia, 2006), the government pays  its employees and contractors by crediting their bank 
accounts (at commercial banks) and debiting its own account at the central bank. In this way, the 
government  becomes  a  debtor  to  its  own  bank.  Depend ing  on  the  banking  system,  the 
government can carry out this operation by sending cheques to those it must pay, who will then 
deposit the cheques in their bank accounts; when the banks receive the cheques, they credit their 
customers‘ accounts. In a more developed banking system, the government can directly credit its 
employees  or  suppliers‘  bank  accounts  by  electronically  ―depositing‖  the  amounts  due. 
Whichever method is used, it is important to note that when deposits are made, the balance 
sheets of commercial banks are increased by an equal amount on the liabilities side (due to the 
increase in deposits) and the assets side (since banks now have a claim on the government). 
Banks‘ claims on the government in this form are called ―reserves.‖ Banks can claim these 
reserves  through  the  central  bank,  which  keeps  accounts  for  both  the  government  and 
commercial banks. In a setting where the central bank is the banking arm of the government, the 
central bank executes the operation simply by crediting commercial banks‘ accounts (that is, by 
adding to  their reserves  and therefore increasing the amount of liquidity in  the system) and 
debiting the government‘s account by an equal amount. Government spending results in a net 
injection of liquidity (money) into the private sector; the government is now running a deficit, 
but the private sector has a surplus. As we mentioned above, government spending increases the 
private sector‘s incomes and, therefore, the accumulated deficits (the ―public debt‖) add to the 
private sector‘s wealth. 
                                                       
2 However, in the early 1990s, legislation was enacted in the European Monetary Union that prevented the 
central bank from granting credit to governments in this manner. This forced governments of countries that became 
members of the EMU to rely on taxation and to resort to commercial banks—and even sell securities—to finance 
their expenditures.   13 
 
What about taxes? We all know that when we pay taxes, our accounts (at commercial banks) are 
debited and the government‘s account at the central bank is credited. In the process, the balance 
sheet of commercial banks will have been reduced on both sides by the same amount, since 
deposits went down and (consequently) banks lost reserves (meaning that their claims on the 
government decreased). The central bank shows this by debiting commercial banks‘ accounts 
and crediting the government‘s account. This operation is the same whether we pay taxes (fines 
and penalties, or contributions to the social security system) or purchase government bonds. One 
can say that the accumulated credits in the government‘s account at the central bank will now be 
tallied against the government‘s debts, which will be reduced or eliminated; however, this has 
nothing to do with the financing of public spending, since the latter has already been paid for. If 
the government collects more taxes (fines and contributions) than it spends, its account at the 
central bank will have a surplus, but the private sector as a whole will be in deficit. This is why 
deficits in the public budget increase liquidity (money) in the private sector and public budget 
surpluses reduce it (see Wray, 1998; Bell, 2001; Bougrine and Seccareccia, 2002).   
In orthodox thinking, there are serious objections to financing government expenditures in the 
way we describe here because of the fears of inflation associated with the government creating 
too much money. But the astute observer will have noticed that there is no such possibility for an 
excess supply of money since all the money that is created has been demanded. When workers 
seek jobs, they are demanding money. When contractors are hired to build a needed school, a 
hospital  or  a  bridge,  they  are  demanding  money  for  compensation.  Therefore  the  supply  of 
money  is  always  equal  to  the  demand  for  money.  The  supply  of  money  cannot  exceed  the 
demand for it and inflation is not a monetary phenomenon. In fact, when the government permits 
unemployment to exist by refusing to hire workers and neglects the infrastructure by not building 
the needed schools, roads,  and so  on, it is  voluntarily choosing to  suppress  the demand for 
money  and  keep  it  arbitrarily  low.  Understanding  money  is  essential  because  it  effectively 
liberates the government from being subject to an imaginary budget constraint and allows it to 
actively intervene to fill the gap of under-utilised capacity of society as a whole, i.e., to strive to 
achieve full employment and high economic growth and development.  
5. Conclusion 
The mechanics of growth and development are deliberately shrouded in mystery. Policymakers 
in poor countries are often duped into thinking that rapid development and caching up with ‗the 
West‘ is pure utopia. International organizations present development as a complex, difficult-to-
understand process; therefore implying, often explicitly, that any policy attempts to deal with the 
problems of underdevelopment will inevitably fail. Our analysis shows clearly that these are 
misleading statements. We demonstrate that it is feasible to kick-start the economy and move it 
toward its highest levels of growth by using fiscal and monetary tools in an optimizing manner. 
In this setting, net government spending is found to be a major source of profits for private firms. 
For this reason, we conclude that government involvement is an essential element for preserving 
and improving the capitalist system. 14 
 
Bibliography 
Amsden, A., 2007, ‗The Tyranny of Empire: Another View of Development‘ in Challenge, vol. 
50, no. 5, pp. 17-27 
Amsden, A., 1996, ‗A Strategic Policy Approach to Government Intervention in Late 
Industrialization,‘ in Solimano, A., (ed.), Road Maps to Prosperity: Essays on Growth and 
Development, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 119-41. 
Amsden,  A.  and  W.  Chu,  2003,  Beyond  Late  Development:  Taiwan’s  Upgrading  Policies, 
Cambridge and London: MIT Press  
Aschauer, D.A., 1990, Public Investment and Private Sector Growth, Economic Policy Institute: 
Washington, DC. 
Barro, R. J., 2002, ‗Education as a Determinant of Economic Growth‘ in Lazear, E. P. (ed.) 
Education in the Twenty-First Century, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, pp. 9-24 
Barro, R. J., 1999, ‗Determinants of Democracy‘ in Journal of Political Economy, vol. 107, no. 
6, Part 2 pp. S158-83 
Barro, R., 1990, ‗Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth‘ Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 98, pp. S103-S125. 
Barro, R. and J. Lee, 1993, ‗International Comparisons of Educational Attainment‘ Journal of 
Monetary Economics, Vol. 32, pp. 363-394. 
Bell, Stephanie. 2000. Can taxes and bonds finance government spending? Journal of Economic 
Issues 34 (3): 603–20.  
Bougrine, H., 2004, ‗Public Debt and Private Wealth‘ in L. Randall Wray and M. Forstater 
(eds.), Contemporary Post-Keynesian Analysis, Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, pp. 24-43. 
Bougrine, H. and M. Seccareccia, 2002, ‗Money, Taxes, Public Spending, and the State Within a 
Circuitist Perspective‘ in the International Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 58-
80. 
Dutt, A. K., 1992, ‗The Origins of Uneven Development: The Indian Subcontinent,‘ American 
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 146-150. 
Dieckmann,  O.,  1996,  ‗Cultural  Determinants  of  Economic  Growth:  Theory  and  Evidence‘ 
Journal of Cultural Economics, Vol. 20, pp. 297-320. 
Easterly, W. and R. Levine, 1997, ‗Africa‘s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions‘ 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 1203-1249. 
Easterly,  W.  and  S.  Rebelo,  1993,  ‗Fiscal  Policy  and  Economic  Growth:  An  Empirical 
Investigation‘ Journal of Monetary Economics, pp. 417-458. 15 
 
Godley, W.  and M. Lavoie, 2007, ‗Fiscal policy in a stock-flow consistent (SFC) model‘ in 
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 79-100.  
Harrison,  L.  E.,  1992,  Who  Prospers?  How  Cultural  Values  Shape  Economic  and  Political 
Success, New York: Harper Collins, Basic Books. 
Kelly, T., 1997, ‗Public Expenditures and Growth‘ Journal-of-Development-Studies, Vol. 4, pp.  
60-68. 
Lavoie, M., and M. Seccareccia, 2006, ―The Bank of Canada and the modern view of central 
banking‖, International Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 58-82. 
Leclaire,  J.  J.,  2008,  ‗U.S.  Deficit  Control  and  Private-Sector  Wealth‘  in  Journal  of  Post 
Keynesian Economics, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 139-49 
McCleary,  R.  M.  and  R.  J.  Barro,  2006,  ‗Religion  and  Economy‘  in  Journal  of  Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 49-72 
Munnell,  A.,  1992,  "Infrastructure  Investment  and  Economic  Growth"  Journal  of  Economic      
Perspectives, Vol. 6, pp. 189-198. 
Rodney,  W.,  1973,  How  Europe  Underdeveloped  Africa,  London:  Bogle-L'Ouverture 
Publications and Dar-Es-Salaam: Tanzanian Publishing House. 
Sanchez-Robles, B., 1998, ‗Infrastructure, Investment and Growth: Some Empirical Evidence‘ 
Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 16, pp. 98-108. 
Setterfield,  M.,  2003,  ‗Neo-Kaleckian  Growth  Dynamics  and  the  State  of  Long-Run 
Expectations: Wage- versus Profit-Led Growth Reconsidered‘ in N. Salvadori (ed) Old and New 
Growth Theories: An Assessment, Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 
pp. 321-39 
Sen, A., 1970, (ed) Growth Economics, Middlesex, U.K.,: Penguin Books. 
Smithin, J., 2003, ‗Interest rates, profits and economic growth‘, in E.J. Nell and M. Forstater 
(eds), Reinventing Functional Finance: Transformational Growth and Full Employment, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 211-23. 
Smithin, J., and B. M. Wolf, 1993, ‗What Would Be a ‗Keynesian‘ Approach to Currency and 
Exchange Rate Issues?‘ in Review of Political Economy, Vol. 5, number 3, pp. 365–383. 
Thurow, L., 1992, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe and 
America, New York: William Morrow and Company. 
Wade, R., 2004, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East 
Asian Industrialization, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 16 
 
Wray, L. R., 1998, Understanding modern money. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
APPENDIX 1 
Here we  give the details  for  solving maximization  problem (15) by  applying Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) theory. We first recast problem (15) to standard form,  i.e. to a minimization 
problem with inequality constraints of the type 0 ) (  x g , using the fact that maximization of 





























,  with constraints  0 min  r r and  0 1  c  .     (26) 
The Lagrangian of problem (26) is given in equation (16). From this Lagrangian we obtain the 







































L         (27b) 
0 ) ( min  r r                       (27c) 
0 )) 1 ( (    c                       (27d) 
0 , 0                           (27e) 
A pair  ) , (  r can be an extremum point only if conditions (27a)-(27e) are satisfied in that point. It 









 , and hence by (27c),  min r r  . When condition (17) is 
imposed, the objective of problem (26) approaches positive infinity as  c  1   and thus the 
boundary  point  c  1  cannot  be  a  minimizer,  i.e.  minimum  is  achieved  at  some  interior 
point c  1  . Hence by  (27d),  0   . Minimizing value of   must satisfy (27b) with 0   , 
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since   / 1 1 1     c . The numerator in the previous equation is function ) ( p  introduced in 
equation  (18).  When  condition  (19)  is  satisfied,  equation  0 ) (   p has  two  roots 
2 1 1      c given by equation (20) (this follows from the well-known formula for roots of 17 
 
second degree polynomials). Moreover, the sign of  ) ( p is negative before  1  and after 2  , and 
positive in the interval ) , ( 2 1   . Since the signs of  ) ( p and   L coincide, we see that  1   is a 
minimum point (and  2   is a maximum point). In summary, pair  ) , ( 1 min  r minimizes the objective 
function  of  problem  (26)  and  consequently  it  also  maximizes  the  objective  of  the  original 
equivalent maximization problem (15). 
APPENDIX 2 
The objective function of problem (15) is the long-run equilibrium level of GDP expressed as a 
multiple of initial GDP. This can be seen by considering the dynamics of GDP in a small time 
interval t  : 
t t t t t tY t e tY c t x Y              with initial condition  z Y  0 . 
Subtracting  t Y from both sides and dividing by  t  yields (recall that  0 Y kt t    ) 
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t t t )
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Letting now  0  t we obtain a non-homogeneous first order linear differential equation for the 
infinitesimal growth rate 
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